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Conflict of Laws--A Rationale
of Jurisdiction
By Roy

MORELAND*

Editor'sNote: This is the third installment of a study and series of
articles on jurisdiction in the field of Conflict of Laws. The first
installment appeared in 54 Ky. L.J. 5 (1965) and discussed, among
other things, "Presence" as a basis of jurisdiction. The second installment appeared in 54 Ky. L.J. 171 (1966) and discussed
"Domicile," "Nationality," "Appearance," and "Consent" as bases
of jurisdiction. The present installment is a discussion of the
"Doing of an Act" as a basis of jurisdiction and discusses both
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and suits between private
persons on the Conflicts level. The fourth and final installment in
this series will appear in Volume 56 of the Kentucky Law Journal.
It will deal with "Service."

VI.

DOING OF AN ACT

Foreword
It is often said that the principle that the performance of a
single act within a state can be a sufficient basis of jurisdiction
over a non-resident individual is rooted in Hess v. Pawloski, 14 a
1927 decision. This is literally true for this is the first case which
applied the principle to a non-resident person. But the fundamental concept of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants had
been used for over a hundred years in the case of foreign corporations, where the corporation did "business" in the local state, and
this corporation analogy undoubtedly contributed to the decision
as to. jurisdiction over private persons in Pawloski. Moreover, the
decision in Pawloski that one act may serve as a basis of juridiction
undoubtedly has affected the currently developing corporation
rule-that one act by a foreign corporation, rather than many acts
constituting doing business, may serve as a basis of jurisdiction
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; LL.B., University of Kentucky; J.D., University of Chicago; S.J.D., Harvard University Law

School.
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over the corporation. In other words, developments in the corporation cases and private person cases have each influenced the
development of the "single act" concept in the other field, and
so it is necessary to study the development of each in order to
understand the historical development of the other. The discussion will begin with the historic concept of jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation, for this concept developed first.
A. Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations
1. First Approach to the Problem.-In view of the natural
interstate commerce between the states, it was not only necessary
and expedient but inevitable for the states to find some ground

or grounds upon which jurisdiction could be asserted over
foreign corporations. And yet the rationale by which this was
done has often occasioned strained reasoning and differing approaches to justify forcing foreign corporations to defend local
suits. An early method of coping with the problem was to require
the foreign corporation to appoint a resident agent for service of
process or to consent to service on a government officer in the
state, such as the Secretary of State. 11 An important case involving
such state regulation was LaFayette Insurance Co. v. Frenchllc
where a resident agent was appointed for the service of process as
provided by statute. It was held that the service was valid. The
Court pointed out that a foreign corporiation could transact
business in the local state only with the consent, express or implied, of the local state. Consequently, the local state could impose reasonable conditions on letting the foreign corporation come
in. To make the foreign corporation consent to service of process upon its local agent was a reasonable condition.
So, this early approach to the problem of jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation because of express or implied consent to
service on a local agent or the Secretary of State was grounded
primarily upon the proposition that the local state could keep
the foreign corporation out, and consequently it could impose
reasonable conditions on letting it come in. The interstate privileges clause of the Constitution applies to persons, not corpora115 The Illinois version of such a statute may be found at CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD & REESE, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 126 (4th ed. 1957).

11659 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856).
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tions. Consequently, a local state can exclude a foreign corporation, it was reasoned.

This doctrine that a state can exclude a foreign corporation
at its pleasure and the reasoning that supports it appear in a
number of cases, one of which is Paul v. Virginia."- A more
recent case supporting the proposition is Railway Express Agency
v. Commonwealth of Virginia."" The writer wonders at the
soundness of the rule and whether, realistically speaking, it is
true. He has seen attempts to keep chain stores and certain other
foreign corporations out of the state field. Vith the American
mania for increased business, the proposition is probably moot.
At any rate the Supreme Court has held in several cases that a
state may not exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in
such a manner as to impose an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce."

9

Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative Equity Co.' 2 0 is a

leading example of the application of this prohibition on such
state action. The point is that to take the approach that a state
can keep out a foreign corporation and that consequently it can
impose, as a condition of letting it come in, reasonable conditions as to service by consent, active or implied, is tenuous and
unrealistic and a poor way to rationalize the obtaining of service
over a foreign corporation.
Fortunately the "consent" approach to the obtaining of jurisdiction over foreign corporations is now dated and out of favor.
Although state statutes providing for "consent" jurisdiction still
exist in most of the states and occasional cases still persist, such
statutes are historic survivors that, although the law has moved
on, still retain a certain amount of vitality.
2. Second Approach to the Problem.-The second approach to
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign corporation-and this has
become widely adopted-was to consider the corporation as "pre21
seni" if it was found to be "doing business" in the forum state.
First suggested in 1882,122 it was not used independently until
11775 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
11s282 U.S. 440 (1931). See STUMBERO, CONFLICT OF LAWS 83 (3d ed.

1963).

11,See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS

85 n.72 (3d ed. 1963).
120 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
121 See Note, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 921 (1960).
1 2
2 St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
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1914 when, in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 123 the
consent theory was held inapplicable because service of process
was not upon the agent designated by statute. Gradually this approach, which was not so fictional and consequently more desirable and realistic than the consent approach, took hold; for a long
period it has been the most desirable method of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The rationale of this approach
is particularly persuasive. It is reasoned that, if a foreign corporation comes into the state and does a number of business acts, it
is fair and equitable that the corporation can be sued there, at
least on business done within the state. However, contrary to the
long-accepted, often criticised, rule that an individual "tagged"
with a summons in a state is subject to a suit in the state on any
transitory cause of action, cases are divided as to whether a foreign
corporation doing business in the forum state can be sued on
24
causes of action unrelated to its activity in that state.'
A number of technical distinctions have grown up as to when
a foreign corporation is "doing business" in the forum state. It
would appear that one substantial business act should satisfy the
"doing business" criterion. But as a matter of law it did not, and
this remains the law today where the jurisdiction is based upon
"doing business." Fundamentally, this was because it was held not
to be fair to subject a foreign corporation to defend a local suit
based upon a single business act. This does not appear realistic
or fair to the local resident who has, he thinks, a substantial
cause of action. Moreover, the courts are beginning to permit
jurisdiction today based upon one substantial act, under the
emerging doctrine that a suit against a foreign corporation can
be based upon one act under the "doing of an act" as a basis of
jurisdiction; however, the requirement of a number of acts has
been the law and remains the law under the "doing business"
jurisdictional tag. For example, an Ohio corporation comes into
Kentucky and sells the plaintiff one order of fruit trees for S1000.
This is the only sale and there is no solicitation of business from
others. The trees are defective. The law has been, and is today,
that the plaintiff cannot get jurisdiction for suit in Kentucky on
the basis of "doing business." Should the plaintiff be able to sue
123 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
124 See Note, 73 HARV. L. REv, 909, 921 & cases in n.79.
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in Kentucky? The law is developing that he can sue today, but
jurisdiction must be based upon the "doing of an act," not "doing
business." This current development will be discussed later in
this paper.
Numerous cases, some of them recent, support the proposition
that nothing less than repeated, continuous acts over a somewhat
extended period will constitute "doing business" in the state. One
of the best cases illustrative of the rule is the notable decision,
InternationalShoe Co. v. State of Washington,'12 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1945. That case, which extended the law in
that it made "solicitation" over a period of time "doing business,"
contains the following language in the opinion by Justice Stone:
'Tresence" in the state ...has never been doubted when the

activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic but also give rise to the liabilities
sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization
to an agent to accept service of process has been given....
Finally, although the commission of some single or occasional
acts of the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an
obligation or liability of the corporation has not been thought
to confer on the state authority to enforce it ... other such

acts, because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of thieir commission, may be deemed sufficient to
render the corporation liable to suit.126 (Emphasis added.)

It may be concluded then that the "doing business" tag as a basis
of jurisdiction over foreign coroprations has been consistently
construed by the United States Supreme Court to require at the
minimum a number of business acts occurring over a period of
time. One substantial act was, and is, not enough to satisfy this
jurisdictional tag. As stated previously, the law is currently developing so that one substantial act is sufficient. But that new basis
of jurisdiction is under the "doing of an act" approach to jurisdiction, not "doing business."
This "doing of an act" as a basis of jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation developed after Hess v. Pawloski, decided in 1927. In
other words, jurisdiction over a non-resident (Hess v. Pawloski)
based upon the doing of an act within the forum state came
first and developed several years before the emergence of the
125326 U.S. 310 (1945).

126 Id. at 317-18.
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principle that the doing of a single substantial act might serve as
a basis of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. Consequently,
Hess v. Pawloski and related cases will be discussed before the
discussion of the "doing of an act" as a basis of jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation.
B. Jurisdictionover Non-resident PrivatePersons
It would seem logical that the rule in Hess v. Pawloski 27 that
a state may obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident private person
on the basis of one substantial act within the state bore a direct
relation to, and was an out-growth of, the long established proposition that a state could obtain jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation, if the corporation had done a series of business acts
over a period within the state. But, as Holmes once said, the law
is not logic but experience, and there does not seem to be a
direct connection between the corporation rule based upon a
series of acts and the basis of jurisdiction over a non-resident
private person, based upon the doing of one act. At least the
opinion in Hess v. Pawloski, the first "doing of an act by a private
person" case, makes no mention of the corporation rule and discusses the rationale for the creation of the new rule without any
reference to, or mention of, the corporation analogy. But the
analogy was there. The "doing business" rule had been used as a
basis of jurisdiction over foreign corporations for half a century,
and undoubtedly furnished an analogy, conscious or unconscious,
for the rule as to private persons enunciated in Hess v. Pawloski.
The important thing about Pawloski was the fact that one act,
rather than a series of acts as in the corporation cases, was held to
be a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over a non-resident private
person. In situations where the defendant had left the state and
was no longer present, was not a domiciliary or national of the
forum state, and had made no appearance or consent to be sued
therein, the rule in Pawloski was an important development in the
law. Where the situation did not come within any of these old,
established bases of jurisdiction but the non-resident had done
a substantial act within the jurisdiction, that act could be seized
127 274 U.S. 852 (1927).
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upon to furnish a basis of jurisdiction for suit, where formerly
the plaintiff would have been unable to bring an action within
that jurisdiction. The Hess v. Pawloski case is itself highly illustrative of the importance of the rule it created. In Pawloski, the defendant, a non-resident, had injured the plaintiff with his automobile and then had left the jurisdiction. The plaintiff would
have been unable to get jurisdiction under any of the old, established bases of jurisdiction. The creation of a new basis of jurisdiction-the doing of an act within the state-gave the plaintiff an
opportunity to bring suit for compensation for his injury. Having
a basis of jurisdiction, service could be obtained on the defendant
without the state, a valid local judgment could be obtained on
the defendant within the forum state, and if the non-resident defendant did not satisfy the judgment, he could be sued on it in
his home state.
As is typical of most transition cases, the rationale of Pawloski
is not wholly clear and simple. A state statute gave the forum state
jurisdiction over a non-resident in a proceeding against him growing out of an accident or collision involving the non-resident, and
it was held that such statute was a valid exercise of the state's
police power. The Court pointed out that automobiles are
dangerous machines and that the state in the public interest may
regulate their use and make residents and non-residents alike
responsible for their damage on the public highways. The statute
provided that service should be by registered mail and that the return receipt should be filed with the declaration in the suit.
Some of the private person cases coming within "the doing of
an act" category suggest that a non-resident by coming into the
forum state "impliedly consents" to jurisdiction and service as
provided by the statute therein. There is an analogy here, of
course, to the early coropration cases which grounded jurisdiction
over foreign corporations on "implied consent." This was because,
it was argued, the local state could keep the corporation out;
therefore the state could make the corporation "consent" to
local jurisdiction as a condition to letting it come in. That argument, tenuous at best, and now dated even in the corporation
cases, has no place at all in private person cases; since the forum
state under the federal constitution cannot keep foreign persons
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out,1 28 there can be no imposition of "implied consent" as a condition to their coming in. 129 In fact consent has nothing to do with

giving the forum state jurisdiction over a foreign person who has
done an act within the state. Whatever the proper rationalization in such cases, it does not rest on consent. That point is certain
and recent cases and commentators agree.
In these cases where jurisdiction is grounded on the exercise
of a state's police power, it is not necessary that the state could
prohibit the doing of the act or business in question; regulation,
the ordinary procedure under police power, is a far cry from
prohibition.
Seven years after Pawloski the Supreme Court rendered a
similar decision in Doherty 8c Co. v. Goodman, 30 a case originating
in Iowa and involving the sale of corporate securities. Once again
there was a statute, this time providing that, if a corporation or
individual maintained an office or agency in an Iowa county,
service could be made on any clerk or agent employed in such
office in all actions connected with the office or agency. Doherty,
a citizen of New York, was sued and served under this statute. The
case does not mention police power as such but points out that
Iowa has treated the business of selling securities as exceptional
and subjects it to special regulation under various laws. The case
relied on Pawloski and a couple of other decisions as precedents
for a state's ability to regulate automobiles on local highways. Of
course, the selling of securities is subject to regulation under a
state's police power, which makes Doherty a police power case.
The new jurisdictional category was somewhat extended by
Dubin v. City of Philadelphia13 in which a non-resident owner
of Pennsylvania property was held amenable to a suit under a
Pennsylvania statute for damages which occurred when the plaintiff fell on a broken sidewalk on defendant's property. The case
does not mention police power as such, but it does rely on the
automobile cases for precedent. However, there is language in the
opinion which seems to go beyond police power as a basis for
2

1 8 U.S. CONST.

129

art. IV § 2.

This is the position of Justice Holmes as stated in Flexner v. Farson, 248

U.S. 289 (1919). See CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRIswoLD &
FLicT OF LAWs 150 n.2 (4th ed.
130 294 U.S. 623 (1935).

1957).

l1834 Pa. D. & C. 61 (C.P. No. 6, 1938).

REESE, CASES ON CON-
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jurisdiction-the flat statement that non-residents should be
answerable for tortious acts by their property in the forum state.
This raises the question whether the exercise of its police power
by the forum state is necessarily the sole basis for the rationalization of constitutionality in such cases and, to go still further,
whether police power is really the fundamental basis for the
exercise of such jurisdiction anyway.
The writer takes the view, broadly enunciated in the Dubin
case, that the "doing of an act" cases should rest upon the proposition that non-residents should be responsible in the forum state
for torts committed (and contracts made) therein. While the
exercise of police power was said to be the basis of jurisdiction in
Pawloski 32 and other early cases, this was transitional reasoning
and fundamentally unsound. The police power umbrella is so
wide that almost any situation, tort or contract in nature, can
be included within its shelter. But the trouble is that these "doing
of an act" situations are no more "police power" in category than
long-recognized bases of jurisdiction such as presence and domicile.
In all these bases of jurisdiction over non-residents, there is some
substantial connection with the forum state that justifies forcing
the non-resident to come and defend a suit therein. This is based
upon a sound public policy which is not necessarily an exercise
of police power. Public policy often embraces police power; it
does not necessarily do so.
An examination will now be made of some statutes and later
cases which rest upon the "doing of an act" as a basis of jurisdiction
over a non-resident private person. 133 As pointed out in the
34
American Law Institute's Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
132 Prior to Pawloski, the Supreme Court had held valid a New Jersey statute requiring non-resident motorists to appoint the New Jersey Secretary of State
as agent to receive service of process in actions brought to recover damages for
auto injuries within the state. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916). It may

well be that this statute would now be invalid for want of proper service in the
light of later decisions. That is the reason the case was not discussed in the text.
See Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
133 Many cases permit jurisdictions and service on an agent in the forum
state. If there was an act by the agent for his master, there should be no problem
as to a basis of jurisdiction under established theories of agency. And, of course,
there should be no problem of service, as the local agent can be served. Typical
agency cases are as simple as that. So, ordinary agency cases do not touch the

fundamental problem of local jurisdiction over a non-resident private person. E.g.,

Johnson v. Westerfield's Adm'r, 143 Ky. 10, 185 S.W. 425 (1911).
134 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoNFLicT OF LAws § 84, Reporter's Note (Tent.

Draft No. 3, 1956).
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statutes in many states provide for jurisdiction over non-resident
private persons as to causes of action arising from one or more
isolated acts within the state. Although the Restatement differs,"35
the writer takes the position, supported by Professor James R.
Richardson of the Kentucky Law School, that no statute is needed,
although this particular basis of jurisdiction was not used at common law. Reasonable extension of common law principles of
jurisdiction, it is believed, permit such result.
In Kawko v. Hower,"1 6 a New Jersey case, a non-resident employer entered into a contract outside the state for work by an
employee in New Jersey. In a suit in New Jersey on that contract,
there was service on the secretary of the forum Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, followed by a forwarding of the service by
him to the non-resident employer, as provided by statute. It was
held that the statute was constitutional and the judgment valid.
This was a New Jersey contract under established workmen's
17
compensation principles. Thus, New Jersey had jurisdiction. 3
In a somewhat similar case in New York, the court met directly
the issue of jurisdiction. This was a suit on a fire insurance policy
on property in New York. 138 The forum held that there was
jurisdiction under the statute. More than likely there were other
insurance policies in effect in New York, so this is probably a
case of isolated acts-rather than one act-within the forum state,
as in Hower above. The Restatement differentiates between isolated acts and "doing business." These two cases could be brought
within the ambit of "doing business," but they are really half-way
between "doing business" and single acts. They are transitional
cases in the "doing of an act" category development.
It is difficult to find cases of a single act committed in the
forum state. One of the most common and clean-cut situations
where a single act is committed by a non-resident occurs in the
cases where a foreign private person or his agent commits a
135 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
CONFLIrCT OF LAws § 84, comment e (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1956).
136 129 N.J.L. 319, 29 A.2d 621 (1943).
137 The issue of jurisdiction was not raised in this case, only sufficiency of
service. The Restatement cites the case as an example of "causes of action arising
from one or more isolated acts" (a contract or isolated contracts of employment).
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84, Reporter's Note (Tent. Draft
No. 3,3 1956).
1 8Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill Mut. Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 487, 120 N.Y.S.2d
418 (1953).
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tort with an automobile in the forum state as in Hess v. Pawloski.1:1 A similar clean-cut single act situation may be found in
the case of a real property tort in the forum state, as in Dubin v.
40
City of Philadelphia.1
Similarly a single act may occur where
the foreign person has done an act outside the state which has an
injurious consequence within the state. For example, the defendant may have blasted near the state lines, causing debris to
fall or windows to break in the forum state. Or, one may cite the
oft-repeated illustration of the case where one intentionally or
negligently fires a bullet from outside the state and produces an
injurious consequence within the state. 141 Similarly, a single act
from without the state causing injurious consequences within may
serve as a contract as well as a tort jurisdictional basis for an
action. Directly in point is McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 14 "-' a foreign corporation case to be discussed later, in which
a contract mailed in Texas was accepted in California, where the
injury occurred. It was held that California had jurisdiction for
suit on the contract based upon the single contract act in that
state. Likewise, in a contract case but involving private persons,
a suit against non-resident defendants was allowed in Florida on
a contract creating an exclusive agency to sell land in that state. 143
The "doing of an act" as a basis of jurisdiction as it applies
to non-resident private persons is stated thus in a tentative draft
of the second Restatement of Conflict of Laws:
A state has judicial jurisdiction over an individual who has
done, or caused to be done, an act which either took place in
the state or resulted in consequences in the state for the purposes of any cause of action arising out of the act within limitations of reasonableness appropriate to the relationship derived from the act.14 4
This statement represents the currently developing law upon
the matter, it is believed. It is submitted that the new rule does not
rest upon the exercise of "police power" for its rationalization but
139274 U.S. 352 (1927).
140 31 Pa. D. & C. 61 (C.P. No. 6, 1938).

141 See Reese & Galston, Doing Of An Act Or Causing Consequences As
Bases Of Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REv. 249, 261-62 (1959).
142 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 6, § 855 (1958).
143 State ex rel. Weber v. Register, 67 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1953).
144 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Coi FLICT or LAWs § 84 (Tent. Draft No. 3,
t956).
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upon the broader concept that an act within the forum state
should subject a foreign person who has committed it to an
action, if in "fair play" to both parties it is reasonable under the
circumstances to do so. In interpreting "reasonableness," some of
the cases speak of "minimum contact" in the forum state. "Minimum contact" is a weasel, ambiguous phrase, not helpful in solving cases. It is far better to say that there must be a "substantial
act," one of sufficient importance to justify forcing the foreign
resident to come in and defend a suit.
The cases and commentators such as Ehrenzweig 145 and the
writers of a comprehensive Note in the Harvard Law Review 146
speak of objections to and limitations on the new rule. For example, shall it apply equally to injurious acts by foreign persons
and foreign corporations? In answering that question, should such
facts as differences in the historical development of the two
categories be taken into consideration? Thus, the original basis
for holding a foreign corporation amenable to a local suit was the
supposed fact that it could be kept out of the state, and consequently procedural burdens could be imposed upon it as a
condition of letting it come in. This argument did not apply to
private persons. This, it is submitted, is erroneous differentiation
today. History has served its purpose; it has little or nothing to do
with the present rationalization for the rule in either instance.
Again, it is suggested that perhaps foreign corporations should not
be bound unless the act was a "business act." It is believed that this
distinction is also valueless. Corporations, too, can commit torts.
To bring the matter to a head, the writer would hope that the
law would develop without distinctions in the application of the
rule as it is applied to foreign private persons and foreign
corporations. That does not change the fact that "the circumstances" may occasionally make the rule applicable in one category,
where it would not be "reasonable" in the other. The same rule
and the same tests should be applied to both foreign corporations
and private persons. The result of its application, however, may
occasionally be different, but that will be because of "reasonableness under the circumstances."
145 Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30 Roc,-1 MT. L.
REv. 285 (1958).
146 Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv.
909, 935-40 (1960).
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3. Third (Current) Approach to the Problem of Jurisdiction
47
over Foreign Corporations.1
-At this point the discussion returns
to the development of jurisdiction over foreign corporations. As
pointed out in the previous discussion, forum courts took jurisdiction over foreign corporations for over fifty years before Hess
v. Pawloski,4 8 the original case of jurisdiction over foreign private
persons. As stated, the first approach to jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation was grounded on the proposition that the forum state
could keep the foreign corporation out; consequently it could impose actual or implied consent to jurisdiction as a condition to
letting the foreign corporation come in. The second approach to
the problem was to consider the foreign corporation as "present"
if it was "doing business" in the state. Jurisdiction based upon
this proposition is found in many current statutes and decisions
and it is still-and will continue to be-widely used. However, coincidentally with "doing business" as a basis of jurisdiction over
foreign corporations, the courts are now bringing foreign corporations under the jurisdictional umbrella of the "doing of an act" as
a basis of jurisdiction-as in the case of foreign private persons.
The leading case which uses the third and current approach is
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 149 In that case the
plaintiff's son, a resident of California, bought an insurance policy
from an Arizona corporation, naming plaintiff as beneficiary.
Later, defendant, a Texas corporation, agreed to assume the
obligations of the Arizona corporation and mailed a re-insurance
certificate to plaintiff's son in California, offering to insure him
in accordance with his policy. This offer was accepted, presumably
by mail, and the son paid premiums from his home in California
to defendant's office *in Texas. Neither corporation had ever had
any office or agent in California or done any business in that state.
After the death of her son, the plaintiff sent proof of his death to
defendant but it refused to pay the claim. Plaintiff brought suit
in California under a state statute subjecting foreign corporations
147 The outline of this installment is somewhat at variance in this subsection,

since subsection 3. of the main division of the Outline, A., follows the main di-

vision B. This is because it was thought advisable to discuss the development of
jurisdiction over foreign private persons before discussing the third approach to

jurisdiction over foreign corporations. What we have here is A.3. of the Outline.
While this creates a variance in the Outline, it permits a more logical and understandable discussion of the development of the two categories.
148274 U.S. 352 (1927).
149 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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to suit in California on insurance contracts with residents of California, even though such corporations could not be served with
process in that state. Process was served by registered mail to the
defendant's principal place of business in Texas, and the plaintiff
obtained a California judgment. Unable to collect the judgment
in California, the plaintiff went to Texas where she filed suit on
the California judgment in a Texas court. But the Texas courts
refused to enforce the judgment, holding it was void under the
fourteenth amendment because service of process outside California could not give the courts of that state jurisdiction over the
defendant.
However, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
the California judgment was valid, since "the suit was based upon
a contract which had substantial connection with that state."'' "
Justice Black, who wrote the opinion, pointed out that the contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from
there, and the insured was a resident of that state when he died.
This, then, is a Supreme Court "one act" case, a single contract
causing the defendant to have substantial connection with the
forum state although it had no other connection whatever with
the state. The case goes all the way in holding that one contract by
a foreign corporation may confer jurisdiction.
In a similar case, a Pennsylvania insurance company mailed to
a resident of New York a policy insuring hotel property in New
Hampshire and received a premium payment by mail from New
York. Jurisdiction in New York was upheld on the basis of that
single transaction under a statute that made "delivery of contracts
151
of insurance to residents" of New York an act in that state.
Courts now commonly, and more easily, permit jurisdiction
based upon a tort committed in the forum state. A leading case is
Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Co.,152 where the highest court
of Vermont in a carefully reasoned opinion upheld a state statute
as constitutional which permitted service on corporate defendants
having committed "a tort in whole or in part in Vermont.' 15

3

A

150 Id. at 223.
151 Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill Mut. Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 487, 120 N.Y.S.2d
418 (1953). See cases cited, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84,
Reporter's Note (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956). See also EEmENZWEic, CONFLICT OF
LAWs 116 n.48 (1962).
152 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
153 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 6, § 855 (1958).
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federal court sitting in Maryland decided likewise as to a similar
Maryland statute.15 4 Unfortunately, both of these cases gave
validity to statutes allowing substituted service upon a forum
state official but that problem is grist for another day's grinding.
Our problem here has to do with basis of jurisdiction, not service.
While courts speak of "contract" and "tort" actions there
should be no fundamental difference as to jurisdiction whether
the action is in tort or contract. It is true that there may be a
difference in result in the two categories, but this is because of
differences in the "circumstances" making it "reasonable" to take
jurisdiction in the one case and not in the other. Torts are more
easily localized' 55 than contracts, although developments such as
the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" doctrine, 56 have
made it increasingly difficult to localize either. The availability
of witnesses may be the decisive circumstance of one of these
cases in either category. The forum may be inconvenient in one
and not in the other. Foreign defendants, both private persons and
corporations, may well be asked to defend a local tort injury suit
more readily than one based upon contract. All such questions
should be decided upon the basis of public policy, reasonableness,
and fair play under the circumstances.
Hanson v. Denckla 57 illustrates the importance of "what is
reasonable and fair play under the circumstances." In that case,
a woman domiciled in Pennsylvania, executed in Delaware a revocable trust of certain securities with a power of appointment,
naming a Delaware trust company as trustee. Later, the settlor became domiciled in Florida, where she remained until her death.
Before her death she executed an instrument exercising her power
of appointment and revoking prior appointments and delivered
the instrument to the trustee in Delaware. She executed a will on
the same day leaving all property not under the trust to certain relatives. In a proceeding in Florida in which the Delaware trust
company was served by mail, the Florida courts held the trust
ineffective under Florida law and the res passed under the resi154 Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Prods. Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (1950).

Comment, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 792 (1952).

See

155 Develnpments In The Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv.
909, 926 (1960).
156 Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); Babcock v. Jack-

son, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
157357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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duary clause of the will. The Florida courts held that the Florida
court had jurisdiction over the non-resident trust company. A
Delaware court with personal jurisdiction over the trust company
sustained the trust and appointment; this decision was sustained
by the Supreme Court of Delaware, and this latter decision was
brought to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme
Court held that the Florida court did not have in rem jurisdiction
over the corpus of the trust or personal jurisdiction over the trust
company. Without such jurisdiction it had no power to pass on
the validity of the trust, and therefore its decree was void.
In deciding the case, Justice Warren, who wrote the opinion
said:
The execution in Florida of the powers of appointment ...
does not give Florida a substantial connection with the contract on which this suit is based. It is the validity of the trust
agreement, not the appointment, that is at issue here ...
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a non-resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement
of contact with the forum state ....

[I]t is essential in each

case that there be some act by which the defendant purposely
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its
8
laws.15
In other words the case held that Florida's connection with the
trust agreement was too insubstantial for personal jurisdiction
over the non-resident trustee. The trust corporation had no office
in Florida and did not transact or solicit business there, t59 "nor
did the cause of action arise out of any act done there by the
corporation."' 60 There were vigorous dissents to the decision.
It is submitted that the case was properly decided. While the
situation perhaps is a close one, the fact remains that the trust
corporation, which is the real defendant in the action, did no
business nor act in Florida. While there was a "relationship" with
Florida, there was no connection by act there. The new rule
should not be watered down so that this technicality is not
satisfied. If it is not reasonably satisfied, it is unreasonable to subject the foreign corporation to a local suit.
158

159

Id. at 253.

Consequently "doing business" could not be a basis of jurisdction.

160 Scott, Hanson v. Denckla, 72 HARV. L. REv. 695, 702 (1959).

"doing of an act" could not be a basis of jurisdiction.

So, the
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As in the case of foreign persons, 161 the American Law Institute
has drafted a rule that the "doing of an act" may serve as a basis
of jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The rule provides:
A state has judicial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation as
to causes of action arising out of (1) an act done, or caused
to be done, by the corporation in the state or resulting in
consequences there, and (2) a thing owned by the corporation in the state within limitations of reasonableness appropriate to the relationship
derived from the act or owner1 62
ship of the thing.
This section covers the rule as to jurisdiction over foreign
corporations in practically the same words as the two rules as to
jurisdiction over non-resident private persons in sections 84
and 84a of the Restatement.'63 This is as it should be for, as
Ehrenzweig points out, "personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations raises essentially the same problems as that over private persons.' '1 64 This is to say that jurisdiction over non-resident private
persons and foreign corporations, while originally developing
separately in regard to each of these two subjects, has now
merged for all practical purposes in the "doing of an act" category.
It is important to recognize this fact.
The new category serves a very useful purpose. Old bases of
jurisdiction, such as presence and donicile, fail to supply a basis
of jurisdiction over non-resident private persons in some cases.
Similarly, "doing business" has jurisdictional limitations in the
case of "isolated and single acts" by a foreign corporation. The
new category gives the forum state additional and needed jurisdictional power in both classes of cases.
As pointed up in Hanson v. Denckla,163 the "doing of an act"
basis of jurisdiction has its limitations. The circumstances become
jurisdictionally important. The absent private person or corporation, as the case may be, should not be required to come in and
defend a local suit unless it is "reasonable and fair play under the
161 RESTATEmNT (SEcoND),

1956).1 6 2

RESTATEziENT (SECOND),

CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 84 (Tent. Draft No. 3,

CONFLICT OF LA-WS

§ 91a (Tent. Draft No. 3,

1956).
1613RESTATEM ENT (SEcoND),

No. 3, 1956).
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164 EHMENzWEiG, CONFLICT OF LAWS

165 357 U.S. 235 (1958).

110 (1962).

§§ 84, 84a (Tent. Draft
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circumstances" to require him to do so. Each close case will thus
depend upon the application of set general rules, tempered by a
sound judicial determination as to whether jurisdiction should be
taken under the circumstances.
Ed. Note: The fourth and final installment in this series will appear in Volume 56 of the Kentucky Law Journal.

